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Real estate crowdfunding (RECF) is a new and evolving investment vehicle that 
is disintermediating traditional capital markets. This research is one of the first 
empirical studies surrounding the RECF space, with the goal of identifying the 
campaign effects of equity crowdfunding on annualized expected return for commercial 
real estate projects. This research uses a hand-collected sample of 165 projects from 
seven leading U.S.-based RECF platforms. I analyze whether property-, campaign-, and 
financing-data explain annualized expected returns of RECF projects based on 
traditional real estate investment principles. In line with traditional principles, results 
show that projects with higher risk (requiring development, redevelopment, or 
renovations) and shorter anticipated holding periods correlate with higher expected 
returns. Additionally, an increase in the ratio of crowdfunded equity (equity released to 
the crowd) to the project’s size results in negative expected returns for investors. This 
signaling would provide evidence that even in the face of disintermediation, actors in 
this market may provide a certification role.  
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SECTION I: Introduction 
Real estate as an asset class represents the single largest component of wealth in 
our society, constituting over 13% of the U.S. gross domestic product annually, 
exceeding the size of equities, mortgages, bonds, and treasury securities (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis).1 The real estate asset class serves as a significant source of value 
creation in the economy and the largest investment for most families. There is seldom 
an opportunity for smaller investors to directly invest in commercial real estate (CRE) 
development and acquisition, an industry historically defined by large capital 
investments and elite networks. The formation of a new type of crowdfunding security 
and appearance of CRE web-based crowdfunding platforms may be the closest thing to 
disrupting the CRE and private capital markets financing relationship. This paper 
focuses on the convergence of two different investment markets, commercial real estate 
and crowdfunding. 
The volume of private and institutional capital supplied to the U.S. commercial 
and multifamily real estate market sales reached over $432 billion FY2016.2 The 
National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) Property Index, 
which acts as a benchmark for the U.S. real estate market, reported an average annual 
return of 12.7% in 2015, beating any other U.S. indexes or securities such as the S&P 
500 and Dow Jones during that period (NCREIF Index). Real estate developers 
typically use private capital markets to finance projects, limiting investment 
opportunities strictly to institutional or wealthy (accredited) investors. Unless small                                                         
1 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP) by Industry Data, Value added. In 
2016, 13.3% of GDP came from real estate, rental, and leasing. 
2 JLL Q4 2016 Investment Outlook, United States 
 
 
2  
investors have access to a network of private placement transactions, direct CRE 
investment remains unavailable to most individual portfolios. CRE has typically only 
been available to small investors through Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT), a 
security (fund) that invests in real estate and trades as shares on a stock exchange. 
Crowdfunding is just beginning to enter popular vernacular; however, there are 
different definitions available. The concept of crowdfunding draws its roots from the 
intersection of microfinance and crowdsourcing. In the case of crowdfunding, the 
objective is to collect money for investment. As the industry emerges, separate 
crowdfunding models have developed: (1) Donation-based crowdfunding; (2) Rewards-
based; (3) Credit-based (debt); (4) Equity-based. In donation-based crowdfunding, 
contributors generally donate small capital amounts to a specific, charitable cause (i.e. 
GoFundMe). Rewards-based crowdfunding involves investors receiving a tangible item 
or service in return for funds (i.e. Kickstarter, Indiegogo). In credit-based 
crowdfunding, the crowd lends money with the understanding the loan will be repaid 
with interest (i.e. Lending Club). Equity crowdfunding is the online process in which 
the ‘crowd’ invests in a private security in exchange for ownership (Andrews, 2013). 
This paper focuses specifically on equity-based crowdfunding, as it relates to direct 
commercial real estate investment. 
Real Estate Crowdfunding termed “RECF” is a new and evolving market, where 
the efficiencies of technology are consolidating deal flow while adding transparency to 
investing. Through crowdfunding, an individual investor does not have to rely on 
networks to locate deals or put up $100,000+ into a single deal. Crowdfunding 
eliminates any barriers to entry historically associated with real estate development and 
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acquisition. Real estate developers can rely on platforms to solicit investments and 
investors can access pre-vetted deals online with as little as $1,000. 
Due to the infancy of the industry, the term “real estate crowdfunding” does not 
have a standard definition. For this paper, RECF follows Schweizer and Zhou’s (2016) 
literature definition: 
“Real estate crowdfunding is a form of financing in which real estate project 
developers make an open call on the internet (through specialized platforms) to 
sell a specified amount of equity- or bond-like shares in a company or project, 
with the aim of attracting a large group of (primarily accredited) investors.” 
RECF offers investors the ability to choose between debt or equity investment 
instruments. The instruments differ in returns and risk. Utilizing debt crowdfunding, the 
investor acts as a lender to the property owner or deal sponsor. The “loan” is secured by 
the property, as the collateral, and investors receive a fixed rate of return established by 
the loan’s interest rate (Wardrop, 2010). Equity crowdfunding exists when investors act 
as shareholders in the property and the risk is proportionate to the amount of capital 
invested. Investor returns are earned, after mortgage debt has been satisfied, through 
shares in rental income of the property and the appreciation value upon disposition. The 
benefit of equity investments is the offer of no cap on returns, contrary to debt that have 
a ceiling of the fixed payments. However, an increase in expected return is paired with 
higher risk, such that equity investors are second-in-line, compared to debtholders, to 
receive payback on investment in the event of a default. 
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Process/Industry 
Regardless of the fundraising process, real estate development and private 
equity deals are structured in a similar fashion, utilizing both equity and debt capital 
markets. The cost of a real estate project has a capital structure consisting of a bank loan 
(majority), real estate developer cash (minority), and the remaining equity that requires 
investment. This empirical analysis will be centered on the sponsor, also termed “the 
syndicator” and General Partner (GP). Private equity real estate is often capitalized 
through a General Partnership/Limited Partnership joint venture (JV). Typically, 90% of 
the equity is distributed to the limited partners and 10% is kept for the sponsor. The 
sponsor sources assets, underwrites transactions, negotiates deals, secures financing, 
performs due diligence, and handles the disposition of assets. A significant value that 
RECF brings to sponsors is speed and ease of capital raising, allowing entities to 
expedite the capital raising timeline that traditionally posed as a bottleneck. 
Crowdfunding models are still in their infancy but are beginning to gain traction. 
According to Massolution 2015 Crowdfunding Industry Report, total North American 
crowdfunding industry fundraising volume in 2015 reached $17.2 billion between all 
crowdfunding models. Specifically, real estate crowdfunding globally grew 156% to 
over $2 billion in 2015, with North America remaining the largest region by funding 
volume.3 
The JOBS Act: A Paradigm Switch 
The greatest accelerator to the growth of the crowdfunding phenomenon was the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act (JOBS Act) signed into law on April 5, 2012 by                                                         
3 Massolution RE Crowdfunding 2015 Report 
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President Barack Obama. The purpose of the law was to encourage funding of U.S. 
small businesses by easing securities regulations (“American Jobs Act”). The JOBS Act 
was introduced to Congress as an attempt to keep up with the technological innovations 
introduced in the financial sector. It introduced a new term to securities law, 
“crowdfunding”. The act established the ability for startups and small businesses to 
raise capital through securities offerings using online crowdfunding. Obama described 
the act as “a game-changer” for both the crowdfunding industry and for all 
entrepreneurs.4 The act allows small companies to access pools of capital from many 
investors, which was previously only available through large financial channels. 
Congress amended the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, both 
longstanding regulations in U.S. history, in the JOBS Act. 
The JOBS Act is expansionary by nature and defines a new type of security 
issued by a company and a new marketplace for these securities (Burgett, 2013). The 
act opened the door to numerous methods of raising capital; this thesis specifically 
focuses on one method, “crowdfunding”. The largest changes for real estate investing 
and equity crowdfunding are within Titles II: Access to Capital for Job Creators, III: 
Crowdfunding, and IV: Small Capital Formation.  
SEC Regulations 
While the JOBS Act was signed into law in 2012, each component title did not 
become effective until the SEC completed the rules of administration. Congress charged 
the SEC with the responsibility of writing the rules to enforce the law. This process has 
                                                        
4 JOBS Act Bill Signing, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-
president-jobs-act-bill-signing  
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proven to be tedious as the SEC slowly releases administrative guidelines. The 
inception of a new security into the U.S. financial market can create a lot of ambiguity 
and vulnerability, making it highly scrutinized by the SEC. 
Titles I, V, and VI of the JOBS Act became effective immediately, but Titles II, 
III, and IV awaited more detailed rulemaking by the SEC (H. R.3606 U.S. Congress 
JOBS Act). The SEC did not meet its original rulemaking deadlines, releasing 
administrative guidelines periodically since 2012. The first action of the SEC was to 
address Title II and lift the general solicitation ban on the sale of securities in 2013, an 
exemption under Regulation D, rule 506(c) of the Securities Act (Rule 506 of 
Regulation D). This rule alone, allowed for the creation of Real Estate Crowdfunding 
(RECF) platforms before any of the other rules on each Title were effective. This 
specific rule allows for general solicitation and mass marketing, including via the 
internet, of private placement offerings to only accredited investors. The SEC defines an 
accredited investor as someone who meets one of two requirements: A net worth, or 
joint net worth with the person’s spouse, that exceeds $1.0 million at the time of the 
purchase; or an individual with an income exceeding $200,000 for single investors and 
$300,000 for a married couple in each of the two most recent years. 
In March of 2015, the SEC approved and released the rules addressing Title IV, 
Small Capital Formation, of the JOBS Act. The approval of Regulation A+ further 
enhanced fundraising opportunities with the ability to include both accredited and non-
accredited investors. Effectively, companies are now capable of soliciting up to $50 
million from non-accredited investors using a mini-registration system (Austin, 2015). 
Real estate developers, operators, and sponsors will now have access to enormous new 
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pools of direct real estate investors. However, the majority of online platforms launched 
their offerings using the Regulation D, 506(c) structure, which is strictly for accredited 
investors. 
Lastly, after more than three years, the SEC released the proposed Title III final 
crowdfunding rules in March of 2016. Ultimately, Title III rules will bring non-
accredited investors into the fold for equity crowdfunding in a limited capacity. This 
new regulation will open the doors to over 300 million potential startup investors 
looking to get involved in initial capital formation. While Title III does democratize 
access to startup investment opportunities, it comes with limitations on both the investor 
and the crowdfunding entity. Most notably, it limits the investment amount companies 
can raise through crowdfunding offerings to $1 million in a 12-month period. 
Additionally, investors are subject to annual caps based on the income and wealth of the 
individual. The crowdfunding limit related to Title III does not apply to the RECF 
industry because investment opportunities in the direct real estate investment space are 
only open to accredited investors at this time. 
The regulatory process for the JOBS Act has proven to be difficult and 
incomplete, leaving many parties in both the public and private sectors displeased. The 
introduction of a new security within the U.S. financial markets requires a robust 
regulatory structure and this task is compounded by the SEC’s mission to protect 
investors from fraud and misrepresentation. As commercial real estate crowdfunding 
evolves, SEC rulemaking will continue to adapt to the intricacies of financial 
technologies and the resulting effects on the general population. 
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SECTION II: Hypothesis Development 
Little empirical research has been conducted surrounding the private CRE 
market. Property specific data has historically been difficult to obtain as owners of CRE 
are reluctant to provide proprietary data for academic research and the data often 
provides only limited information. The choice of which independent variables to 
include in the analysis is based upon relevant literature on private real estate 
development and investment in traditional capital markets. There are few studies on the 
risk-return relationship of private real estate at the property level, but the existing 
literature allows for a stronger understanding of which variables to control for and their 
influence on the interpretation of the results. This research explores how property, 
campaign, and financing characteristics affect expected return for equity-based CRE 
crowdfunding projects.  
The first goal of this research is to predict annualized expected return of RECF 
projects exclusively from property characteristics. The underlying asset of RECF 
projects are real properties, where cash-flow risks are largely determined by property 
characteristics. Physical property variables are a major element of a property’s value 
and, therefore, have a direct impact on returns. The main explanatory variables within 
property characteristics are size, development, and multifamily. 
 
H1 (Property Characteristics): The expected return for equity-RECF projects is 
positively associated with the underlying property’s level of development, size, and 
multifamily status. 
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The study explores the effect of size by including the natural log of the dollar 
amount of the estimated value of the commercial property, log(size).5 Estimated value is 
measured by the estimated renovated/repaired value for renovation projects and 
appraised value for all other projects. The size factor in real estate is considered because 
it has been found to work opposite to the size relationship within the stock market, 
where larger properties command an expected return premium (Pai, 2007). This could 
possibly signify an ‘illiquidity premium’ for larger properties as it may be more difficult 
to sell in a market downturn. Pai and Geltner find that larger value properties located in 
top-tier markets exhibit higher returns than smaller properties located in tertiary 
markets. This variable is expected to be positive because of the risk premium associated 
with larger, commercial properties.  
This analysis controls for whether the property type is multifamily by including 
a dummy variable, multifamily. This variable takes on a value of one if the property-
type identifies as multifamily, five or more units, or zero if the property type is 
different. Based on this specification, approximately 55% of the project observations in 
this analysis are multifamily property-type. Examining each commercial property-type 
separately is unrealistic due to unavailable public data in the crowdfunding space 
currently. Property-specific characteristics, such as property-type and location, explain a 
majority of long-term returns in private real estate investment. The NCREIF database 
                                                        
5 Natural log transformation was applied for the independent variable because of a non-linear relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables. Distribution of independent variable had a positive 
skew and logarithm transformation helps fit the variable into a linear model. 
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indicates that apartment and retail properties have the largest expected returns out of all 
property types by size and tier.6 
This analysis also controls for asset risk, measured by level of development (or 
redevelopment) and major renovation required by the sponsor. This asset risk 
explanatory variable is represented as a dummy variable, development. Expected return 
of a direct real estate equity investment is a function of the cash flow risks associated 
with the property, including the level of development or redevelopment required once 
the property is acquired. The largest cash flow risks are land development projects 
because of the terms and uncertainties surrounding project budget and disposition. 
Ultimately, risk is tied strongly with level of development required for the project 
(Ling, 2013). For this empirical study, projects were categorized from online 
marketplaces into the real estate private equity four major investment strategies, core, 
core-plus, value-add, and opportunistic. Each strategy has its own risk-return 
relationship (Brady, 2016). A designated investment profile provides investors 
information surrounding the risk, location, occupancy, and state of the property. For 
RECF campaigns, the sponsor (General Partner) acts as the underwriter and will 
designate the property’s investment profile on the marketplace providing insights to the 
riskiness of the project. For properties without a designated investment profile, the 
underwriting sponsor’s private equity investment strategy (found on the organization’s 
website) was used in its place. A development value of one indicates the property lies 
within the value-add or opportunistic profile where a greater risk occurs from major 
renovations or development to the property. A development value of zero indicates the                                                         
6 NCREIF Property Index (NPI), https://www.ncreif.org/data-products/property/  
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project is a core or core plus investment profile, with limited renovation required and 
ultimately less risk. This variable is expected to be positively related to advertised 
return because of the risk premium expected by investors for riskier assets.  
The second goal of this research is to predict expected return of RECF projects 
from campaign characteristics. The structure and length of the campaign influences 
expected returns for investors. Campaign characteristics focus on the sponsor’s 
decisions and platform fixed effects. The major independent variables for campaign 
characteristics predicting advertised return are term and minimum investment. 
 
H2 (Campaign Characteristics): The expected return for RECF equity properties is 
positively associated with the targeted investment holding period and a higher minimum 
investment, keeping property characteristics constant. 
 
Term acts as a campaign independent variable that refers to the estimated 
holding period of the asset until sale. Brick and mortar real estate investments represent 
illiquid assets; therefore, the property tenure is a crucial variable for investors. The 
targeted holding period provides investors an idea of how long capital is tied up until 
the sale of the property. Different property-types and construction plans require 
different expected holding periods, which can vary from approximately one year to 
more than ten years. The targeted holding period, term, is a factor that may have a 
significant effect on the expected return. Because RECF investments are mostly illiquid, 
greater holding periods translate to greater risk. An illiquidity premium is anticipated to 
compensate for greater systematic risk (Acharya, 2005). The term variable is expected 
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to have a positive effect on advertised return as the illiquidity premium increases with 
the holding period. 
RECF campaigns differ by the minimum investment amount required by 
investors. Minimum investment varies across platforms and specific deals, typically 
ranging from $5,000-$50,000. This study explores the effect of minimum investment by 
including the natural log of the dollar amount of the minimum investment, 
log(min_invest).7 Due to lack of data available from private equity real estate deals for 
minimum investment requirements, we can borrow from mutual fund empirics. Higher 
minimum investment requirements for retail and institutional mutual funds are related 
to higher performance, resulting in higher expected returns (Karceski and James, 2002). 
Based on mutual fund performances, we can assume that RECF projects with higher 
minimum investments are related to higher expected returns. 
The third goal of this research is to predict expected return of RECF projects 
from financing characteristics. The financing decisions and capital stack structure made 
by the sponsor effect investment returns. Specifically, this research explores how 
leverage and crowdfunding ratio predict expected returns.  
 
H3 (Financing Characteristics): RECF project’s expected return is positively related 
to leverage and negatively related to crowdfunded ratio, keeping property 
characteristics constant. 
The explanatory variables related to financing characteristics for RECF include 
leverage and crowdfunded ratio.  Leverage represents the loan amount of the project                                                         
7 Natural log transformation is used once again for the same reasons given in footnote 3 
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divided by the size or appraised value of the property. A close relationship exists 
between capital structure for a CRE deal and cash flow risk. A return predictive variable 
related to the financing structure of each real estate deal is the Loan-to-Value (LTV) 
ratio. Although this empirical analysis focuses solely on equity-based RECF deals, a 
property’s leverage represents a source of financial risk for equity investors. As 
debtholders are usually paid first in cases of default, an increase in leverage (higher 
LTV) increases equity investor risk due to no value remaining after debtholder 
payment. Imposing higher leverage in the financing structure passes excess risk to the 
equity investor which translates to higher expected equity returns. 
The crowdfunded ratio, the percentage of equity capital raised by the crowd for 
projects, may influence the annualized expected return. Crowdfunded ratio may be one 
of the determinants of crowdfunding success as it relates to expected return, and is the 
only explanatory variable that addresses signaling influence from sponsors. Ahlers, et al 
(2005) presented the first-ever empirical examination of signaling within the equity 
crowdfunding context. They found a negative relationship between the amount of equity 
sold to investors and funding success. Ahlers, et al argue that indirect investment in an 
entrepreneur’s own project, in other words keeping more equity, is an effective way to 
signal quality. Although CRE assets differ from venture capitalism investments, the 
equity signal is still relevant. Sponsors, as the underwriters of the project, allocate a 
portion of the overall financing to the crowd. The greater the crowdfunded ratio 
indicates that the sponsor is signaling “less skin in the game” and vice versa. 
Crowdfunded ratio variable is expected to have a negative relationship with annualized 
expected return. 
 
 
14  
SECTION III: Data & Methodology 
This analysis looks to explain advertised expected returns of RECF projects by 
several predictor variables. These variables allow the study to control for correlations 
among the predictors and the expected returns. The analysis employs an ordinary least 
squared (OLS), linear regression where the dependent variable is the targeted Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) of direct commercial real estate investments. All data for the 
following independent variables was collected from RECF platform marketplaces and 
online commercial real estate brokerage marketplaces. This study examined 165 
commercial projects that involved equity crowdfunding from seven leading U.S.-based 
RECF platforms: 1) CrowdStreet, 2) Real Crowd, 3) iFunding, 4) EarlyShares, 5) 
Equity Multiple, 6) Acquire Real Estate, 7) RealtyShares. These specific platforms were 
selected because they have areas of operations on in the U.S., offer equity financing 
projects, serve commercial properties, have similar fundraising procedures, and they all 
present information in a similar fashion. This study investigates funded RECF deals 
from Q4 2015 through Q1 2017. It includes commercial real estate deals across all 
property-types, investment profiles, and locations. 
The breakdown of projects by platform and property-type composition for this 
study can be found in Table 1. Among all commercial projects, multifamily projects 
make up 55% of the total subtotal. Some platforms (e.g. Acquire Real Estate & Equity 
Multiple) are relatively new and thus list fewer campaigns than more established 
platforms (e.g. Crowdstreet & RealtyShares). Additionally, platforms specialize in 
specific strategies and crowdfunding securities. For example, CrowdStreet specializes 
in equity financing projects for commercial real estate only. RealtyShares provides both 
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equity and debt crowdfunding vehicles, but has a higher percentage of residential 
properties available for investment on the marketplace. Figure 2 provides a platform 
overview that addresses specific strategies. For this research, only equity CRE projects 
were collected for analysis.  
All data for this study was hand-collected through investor registration in the 
above marketplaces. For each RECF project, missing property- and financing-data was 
complemented with additional research into CRE brokerage sales. Figure 3 provides the 
correlation coefficients for the main independent variables. Figure 4 gives descriptive 
statistics for the 165 RECF campaigns sample. 
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Figure 1: Sample Construction 
This table gives the RECF platforms for each equity campaign launch and the specific commercial real 
estate property-types examined in this study. Information comes from the respective webpage. Note that 
full information was not available for all platforms. 
 
 
Sample by Real Estate Crowdfunding Platform
Equity 
Projects
RECF Platform
CrowdStreet 49
iFunding 9
RealtyShares 15
Real Crowd 63
Acquire Real Estate 7
Equity Multiple 13
EarlyShares 9
Total 165
Commercial Property-Types
Multifamily 90
Office 22
Retail 21
Hotel 16
Industrial 8
Other 8
Total 165
 
 
17  
Figure 2: Sample Construction 
This figure gives the RECF platforms for each equity campaign launch and the specific commercial real 
estate property-types examined in this study. Information comes from the respective webpage. Note that 
full information was not available for all platforms 
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Figure 3: Correlations between Independent Variables 
 
 
Figure 4: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
Exp 
Return development log(size) multifamily term
log(min 
invest) leverage cf ratio
Exp Return 1.0000
development 0.3402 1.0000
log(size) 0.1608 -0.0580 1.0000
multifamily 0.1157 0.0820 0.0630 1.0000
term -0.2219 -0.1405 0.2539 -0.0441 1.0000
log(min invest) 0.1206 -0.1148 0.3385 0.0510 0.2430 1.0000
leverage 0.2038 0.0356 0.0672 0.4331 0.0541 0.1218 1.0000
cf ratio -0.2218 0.0331 -0.1852 -0.0031 -0.1519 0.2528 -0.0612 1.0000
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
development 164 0.726 0.448 0.00 1.00
size 95 7.044 0.427 5.56 7.97
multifamily 165 0.558 0.498 0.00 1.00
term 154 4.807 2.019 0.83 10.00
min invest 135 4.303 0.341 3.00 4.88
leverage 55 0.704 0.081 0.57 0.93
cf ratio 83 0.274 0.368 0.00 2.86
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Four OLS regressions were employed in this thesis, which include a 
combination of the previously discussed independent variables. The regression 
equations used in the analysis are detailed below and the results are presented in Figure 
6. Regression equations (1) - (3) directly address hypotheses 1-3. OLS regression (4) 
includes all explanatory variables discussed previously and their effect on expected 
return.  
 
Figure 5: OLS Regressions 
(1) 
Exp_Returnit = αi + β1developmenti + β2log(size)i + β3multifamilyi + ϵi  
(2) 
Exp_Returnit = αi + β1developmenti + β2log(size)i + β3multifamilyi + β4termi + 
β5log(min_invest)i + ϵi 
(3) 
Exp_Returnit = αi + β1developmenti + β2log(size)i + β3multifamilyi + β4leveragei + 
β5cf_ratioi + ϵi 
(4) 
Exp_Returnit = αi + β1developmenti + β2log(size)i + β3multifamilyi + β4termi + 
β5log(min_invest)i + β6leveragei + β7cf_ratioi + ϵi 
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SECTION IV: Results 
Figure 6: Regressions 
Regressions on the determinants of change in the dependent variable, expected return annualized for 
investors. Development is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the investment profile of the 
real estate asset is either value-add or opportunistic. Size indicates the size of the commercial real estate 
property in terms of “as-is” appraised value or renovated/repaired value. Multifamily is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the property-type is an apartment complex with 5+ units. Term indicates the 
targeted investment hold period in years. Minimum Investment is the minimum dollar amount requirement 
for each deal available to investors. Leverage is the ratio of debt financing to estimated value (size) of the 
property. Crowdfunded Ratio is the ratio of crowdfunding utilized to finance the total transaction divided 
by the estimated value (size) of the property.8 
 
                                                         
8 Each regression has a slightly different sample size because Stata, the statistical software employed to 
run this analysis, omits observations that are missing data on at least one of the independent variables. 
Dependent Variable: Expected Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property Characteristics
Development 0.039***                 
(3.78)
0.041***                    
(3.26)
0.040***                    
(2.97)
0.038**                    
(2.61)
Size .004                   
(.37)
.009                            
(.67)
.014                      
(.89)
.012                       
(.72)
Multifamily .011                          
(1.18)
.012                           
(1.23)
 -.0001                             
(-0.09)
 -.001                       
(-.11)
Campaign Characteristics
Term -  -.006**                           
(-2.58)
-  -.006**                             
(-2.36)
Minimum Investment - .004                             
(.819)
- .041*                        
(1.78)
Financing Characteristics
Leverage - - .111                            
(1.39)
.095                      
(1.10)
Crowdfunded Ratio - -  -.043                               
(-1.42)
-.075**                  
(-2.28)
Constant 0.122                       
(1.55)
.098                        
(1.07)
-.011                   
(-.09)
 -.119                               
(-.92)
Observations 93 78 53 49
R-squared 0.168 0.269 0.219 0.337
coeffecient, t-statistic in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Figure 6 presents the results for the multivariable analysis. In model (1), the 
analysis primarily considers property characteristics as explanatory factors, addressing 
Hypothesis 1. In model (2), campaign characteristics, term and min investment, are 
added as independent variables, addressing Hypothesis 2. Model (3) addresses 
Hypothesis 3, looking at financing characteristics, leverage and crowdfunded ratio, 
paired with property characteristics in relation to expected return. Model (4) 
incorporates all independent variables into the regression model to analyze the 
relationship between property, financing, and campaign characteristics and the 
combined effect on annualized expected return. 
In line with Hypothesis 1, model (1) indicated that all three property 
characteristic variables, development, size, and multifamily, have positive effects on 
annualized expected return. This confirms the principles of investment risk and 
property-type in the RECF market. If the project involves development or 
redevelopment, as opposed to refinance, minor renovations, or lease-up, is larger in size 
(value), and multifamily property-type, the expected return is higher in most of the 
models. However, the coefficient estimates for size and multifamily are insignificant in 
most cases. Although multifamily is positive in models (1) and (2), it becomes negative 
in the remaining models after adding more controls.  
The variable of risk, measured by development or redevelopment required for 
the project, development, is of particular interest because it has not been examined in 
relevant literature pertaining to RECF. The estimated coefficient for this variable is 
significant at the 1% level and, as expected, has a positive correlation with the 
annualized expected return for investors. Development is the most accurate indicator of 
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risk level out of all explanatory variables, as it signified whether the sponsor planned 
major renovations or development on each project. To better understand this important 
variable, its relationship with the independent variable, term, which is additionally 
significant at the 5% level throughout this analysis, requires examination. Figure 3 
shows the correlation between development and term as -14.05%. The interpretation of 
this negative correlation is that projects within the value-add and opportunistic category, 
requiring heavier renovation/development, are typically held for shorter periods due to 
the risk associated with the project. Core and core plus assets are less risky and 
therefore bought and held for longer terms to generate sustained cash flows. 
Development proves to be the most significant variable explaining expected returns, 
with an average coefficient of .04. 
Campaign characteristics prove to be some of the most important factors in 
explaining advertised returns. The coefficient estimates of term are consistent and 
highly statistically significant across all model specifications, indicating a negative 
relationship between holding period length and expected returns, contrary to Hypothesis 
2. This is most likely because of the correlation and association with development, level 
of risk, which proves to have a greater effect on expected return. In line with 
Hypothesis 2, min investment is positively associated with expected return, however, 
only slightly significant across some of the model specifications. For example, a 1-
standard deviation increase in minimum investment is associated with a .41% premium, 
based on model (4).  
According to the regression results presented in Figure 6 model (3) - (4), 
financing characteristic leverage has a positive effect on annualized expected return. 
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Unexpectedly, the leverage variable is not significant at any level. Although this 
estimated coefficient is not statistically significant, the analysis shows that a larger 
leverage ratio indicates a slight positive expected annual return for investors.  
The crowdfunded ratio variable is of particular interest in this analysis because 
of the signaling effect to investors described earlier. This theory has not been examined 
in relevant literature pertaining to CRE. The estimated coefficient for crowdfunded ratio 
is statistically significant at the 5% level in model (4) and, as expected, has a negative 
correlation with the expected return. This indicates that more equity released to the 
crowd by the sponsor relative to the size of the project translates to lower expected 
return for investors. However, greater crowd participation in projects with less risk and, 
therefore, lower expected returns may be a conscious choice for sponsors selecting 
which projects to open to the public. Sponsor’s goal within RECF is to maximize 
project funding chances, where complexity and project risk is lower for less 
sophisticated investors. The idea that more complex deals are typically self-selected 
privately by sponsors, which consist of higher expected returns as a form of 
compensation. Oppositely, higher crowdfunding ratios are negatively associated with 
expected returns. For investors, the amount of equity available to the crowd can act as a 
signal for the relative risk-level, complexity, and expected return of online projects. 
 Baseline results largely support Hypotheses 1-3, and suggest significant 
relationships among expected return and property, campaign, and financing 
characteristics, most notably, development, term and crowdfunded ratio. 
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SECTION V: Conclusion 
To identify the effects of equity crowdfunding on annualized expected return of 
commercial real estate projects, an empirical analysis on 165 equity crowdfunded CRE 
projects was performed.9 The analysis resulted in significant expected returns for 
crowdfunded projects for three notable, independent variables: the dummy variable 
indicating whether the project required development, redevelopment, or renovation, the 
term variable indicating the expected hold period in years, and examining the project’s 
equity crowdfunding available as a percentage of the project’s total value, crowdfunded 
ratio. 
The inconsistencies related to explanatory variables, such as term and minimum 
investment, may be attributable to factors other than the crowdfunding effect, such as 
specific property-type data constraints. The evidence pertaining to the project’s 
crowdfunded ratio provides insight on how sponsors’ crowdfunding capital formation 
may signal potential risk levels and expected returns for online projects. 
There are shortcomings to this analysis that need to be acknowledged. Due to 
the nature of the industry and the accredited investor regulatory requirements on most 
platforms, comprehensive and coordinated data is difficult to obtain. Data collection 
restrictions caused missing data for select observations. Additionally, location plays an 
instrumental role in commercial real estate valuation and investment. Unfortunately, a 
standardized independent variable for location did not appear within this study due to 
the inability to obtain proper database entrance.  
                                                        
9 Although the full sample was not used in all analyses because of missing data for select observations 
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This research did not identify all effects equity CRE crowdfunding has on 
expected return, but instead provided a baseline understanding of some explanatory 
variables that play a role in the current RECF landscape. Further examination of the 
realized returns and how it compares with expected returns for both crowdfunded and 
non-crowdfunded projects should be examined and identified with rigorous analysis. 
Additionally, further examination regarding sponsor co-investment, crowdfunded ratio, 
and the role of signaling for crowdfunded projects is required. Once a comprehensive 
analysis is completed with regard to the equity commercial real estate crowdfunding, 
there will be a more complete understanding of how this new security affects sponsors 
and investors involved in the event. 
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